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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	M.F.)
11) CIVIL NO. 3:20-cv-08742-WHA
12	Plaintiff,)
13	v.) REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO
14) MOTION UNDER FED. RULE OF) CIV.P., RULE 59(e); and RULE 60 (b)(3)
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16	Kilolo Kijakai) DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 9, 2022
17	Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
18	Defendant.)
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20	I. INTRODUCTION
21	This Motion to Alter Judgment (Rule 59(e), and Rule 60 (b)(3) Fraud, Misrepresentation
22	or Misconduct) are detailed here because prior to this Court's Order of May 2, 2022, Plaintiff
23	believed this court only adjudicated one important argument, psychotropic medication refusal
24	and not: 1 the use of the Medical Vocational Guidelines (Grids), 2. The non-inclusion of
25	substantial limitations in the VE hypos and 3. the misuse of the regulation providing for hiring a
26	CE, because the Court chose not to adjudicate these issues including of a substantial 40 year
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fraud against those whose disability is mental and/or developmental. Plaintiff's counsel was a senior attorney for the SSA during the 1980s and knew then and now that the Grids cannot lawfully be used for solely non-exertional impairments as more fully described herein. It was not until the May 2, 2022 Order on attorney fees that another explanation came to light when this Court articulated that there was no bad faith because "... Plaintiff provides only unsupported and conclusory assertions of bad faith...." Order at 5-6 (Doc 35.) The Court should adjudicate on the merits because Defendant has committed a massive fraud on the public and Plaintiff by unlawfully applying the Grids to Major Depression and VE hypotheticals not being based on all functional limitations in the record.

I. THE MEDICAL VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES DO NOT APPLY TO NON-EXERTIONAL DISABILITIES

Because the ALJ found the opinions of the State agency (DDS) consultants were supported by the medical record, they serve as substantial evidence to support the ALJ's RFC findings. But the SSA is misrepresenting; it also stated: ".... The ALJ adopted these opinions because they were consistent with the medical record including the "mild objective findings" and supported subjective statements. AR 22, "SSA MSJ at 11:24-26, 12:2-5. This finding is not based on substantial evidence since the ALJ adopted the DDS doctors who did find substantial evidence (See p.6, *infra*,) which violated *the treating source rule* in that the SSA must articulate specific and legitimate reasons for not giving Drs. Diamond and Yalom more weight than a non treating, non-examining (like DDS) doctors, without it there is legal error. See *Lester v. Chater*, 81 F.3d 821(9th Cir. 1995) and *Garrison v. Colvin*, 759 F.3d 995. (9th Cir. 2014.)¹

¹ The Supreme Court analyzed an analogous situation in *Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney*, 489 U.S. 169 (1987) and found that so long as there are fundamental issues of fairness or justifiable unique circumstances, Rule 59(e) is cognizable after 28 days.

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The premise for the SSA 40-year fraud on our country's population with psychiatric and/or developmental disabilities especially in light of what happened in the underlying facts and resulting waiver law in *Bowen v. New York*, 476 U.S. 467 (1986) justify a deeper look into a vast and continuing fraud into a vulnerable segment of our population "... Where the Government's secretive conduct prevents plaintiffs from knowing of a violation of rights, statutes of limitations have been tolled until such time as plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to learn the facts concerning the cause of action...." *Ibid*.

In this 59(e) Motion Plaintiff states ".... The DDS also used the Medical Vocational Guidelines, which do not apply to mental/non-exertional disabilities. AR 64. Clear and substantial authority is stated in Plaintiff's MSJ, Argument C - are in Plaintiff's MSJ opening brief at 17:19-24, 17:24-28, 18:3, and 18:18-22.

Both the ALJ and DDS rely on a 1985 SSR 85-15 (attached as Ex. A), and Rule 204.00 of the Grids for solely non-exertional limitations. ALJ Dec. AR 22, DDS at AR 64 near bottom. The SSA MSJ OPP. at 7: n. 7 references SSR 85-15 which in turn states it is in accord with a non-cited order of a district court in Minnesota (MN) even though the Supreme Court in 1983, 2 years prior, issued an opinion on the same guidelines. Moreover, looking at the 15 most recent cases in the Ninth Circuit, it appears that all district courts reject SSR 85-15 as something that is not reliable. There did not appear to be any Court of Appeals opinions to cite.

The SSA's MSJ Opp. (Doc 22) at 12:5-22, n.7 The SSA states Plaintiff is presumed to have the highest exertional level, heavy/very heavy. This absurd statement means this 58-year-old woman can lift and carry over 100 pounds daily on a sustained basis day after day and her Major Depression may or may not affect her strength. The SSA cites fake grounds inconsistent with the Supreme Court upholding the Grids arguing that *Thomas*, 278 F.3d at 957 is legal

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support for this. First, the opinions of the DDS doctors are not supportive of this. See *infra* at 5:22-25 and 6:1-21. In other words, this is a misrepresentation, second, Plaintiff *Thomas* was examined by an orthopedic surgeon, for neck and right wrist pain. He diagnosed right carpal tunnel syndrome and neck pain radiating into the right arm which means she has exertional, resulting functional limitations, third, *Thomas v. Barnhart*, 278 F.3d 947(9th Cir. 2002) has been overruled by 20 C.F.R.\(\) 404.1529. How we evaluate symptoms, including pain states, in part, we consider all your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence. In other words, "adjudicators will not assess an individual's overall character or truthfulness in the manner typically used during an adversarial court litigation. The focus of the evaluation of the individual's symptoms should not be to determine whether he or she is a truthful person."

The *Heckler* case always overrode SSR 85-15 cited by the ALJ and DDS and states:

"... These guidelines relieve the Secretary of the need to rely on vocational experts by establishing through rulemaking the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy. They consist of a matrix of the four factors identified by Congress -- physical ability (emphasis added), age, education, and work experience ... she must consider whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person having the claimant's qualifications could perform..." Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461-2, 103 S. Ct.1952 (1983) (internal citations omitted.)

SSR 85-15 omits the Supreme Court under *citation of authorities* and tries to justify its purpose as clarifying SSR 83-13 which is not available to the public. The title, the SSA states is the same, i.e., the medical vocational rules as a framework for evaluating solely non-exertional impairments, which is unlawful.

The issues in the supreme court case are also due process issues: 1. the ALJ must consider each of Claimant's functional limitations; specifically, and 2. each person's physical ability, age, education, work experience and the Claimant's literacy in English. The two basic

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underlying criteria are 1. Exertional level and skill level. There are four exertional categories; i.e., sedentary, light (a Claimant can frequently or up to 2/3 of a day, lift and carry 10 pounds and occasionally or up to 1/3 of a day, 20 pounds, medium, heavy and very heavy and skills are divided into three categories – unskilled (can be learned under 30 days), semi-skilled and skilled, all as defined. *Id* at 461-465.

In the present case the SSA's position is bad faith which according to EAJA results in punitive damages. Clear and substantial authority is stated in detail in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ) as Argument C². at 17, 19-22. Its purpose to obviate the need to testimony of a vocational expert (VE) in back/spine impairment cases, the largest number of disability cases.³ For the deficient hypo VE argument in this case, see Plaintiff's opening MSJ at 19-22.

A treating source medical provider's opinion must be given more weight than a 1 time examining provider like Dr. Salvador-Moses, CE or DDS doctors, chart readers who have never seen the patient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821(9th Cir. 1995) and Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995. (9th Cir. 2014). The treating source rule applies to M.F. notwithstanding SSA's eliminating their treating source regulation because this case was filed in 2016 before the new regulation took effect. In evaluation of mental impairments 20 C.F.R. § § 416.920a. Evaluation of mental impairments. This include using the psychiatric technique that was not done and looking back longitudinally which apparently was not done.

² It should be noted that in Plaintiff's opening brief Argument "C" and "D" are interposed in the Table of Contents "D" and Argument" C".

³ See https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n2/v73n2p39.html

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III. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT NEEDED TO BE IN VE HYPOS

Moreover, intentionally overruling a Supreme Court case (*Heckler*) is unconstitutional. At AR 58 the DDS doctor states "We believe that Claimant may meet [Listing] 12.04 medical listing..." which is the highest level of severity and Plaintiff's major depression is so severe that if affects relationships, social interactions, limits concentration, causes sleep disturbance and her prognosis is guarded. Plaintiff's disability affects her ability to interact with supervisors and it would be difficult to get through the workday without distractions. They go on to find that although the primary major depression is severe, the secondary trauma and stressor related disorder is also severe. AR 58. Cases at the administrative level are supposed to be based on evidence, not on an end result (not disabled) dictated by the SSA. At AR 60 her symptoms are detailed to limitations in understanding and memory limitations, sustained concentration and persistence limitations, social interaction and ability to adapt limitations. AR 60 and AR 61. Her work-related limitations are reaffirmed in major part including concentration, persistence, and attention for extended periods and the ability to complete a workday for extended periods. Plaintiff needs an unreasonable amount of rest periods. Like most individuals with mental disabilities, some limitations are at the highest level of severity. Other are "moderately" limited and others are not significantly limited as is the case here; e.g., when the question is does Plaintiff needs "special supervision." Indeed, at the highest level of severity, Listing 12.04 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, subpt P, App.1, Listing 12.04 requires 1 from 12.04 A, 2 out of 12.04 B. or C. Specifically, A. has 19 options. B. has 4 options and C. where one does not need A. and B. has 3 criteria. As stated in Plaintiff's MSJ the ALJ declined to continue the hearing because a psychiatrist canceled 10 minutes prior to starting the hearing. P MSJ,14:12-16. It is likely she

would have said Plaintiff meets or equals Listing 12.04 - *Depressive, bipolar and related disorders*.

IV. WRONGFUL HIRING OF A CE

20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a(b) - When we will purchase a consultative examination and how we will use it. As the SSA does not deny that any of the reasons under this regulation require hiring a CE (IME). Dr. Salvador- Moses, a CE whose examination and opinion are consistent with the applicable treating source rule. Drs. Diamond and Yalom are both treating sources. Nevertheless, the 2 DDS doctors who never saw the patient apparently were told "this is a denial case." It is not unusual for the SSA to tell its DDS contractors the outcome or parts of the outcome (AR 64) and this time DDS did not comply with this CE regulation (AR 57.) See SSA MSJ Opp. at 12: n7 along with SSR 85-15 cited by DDS at AR 64.

V. CONCLUSION

In the SSA's MSJ Opp. at 12, the Agency states: "...In this case, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's "ability to perform work at all exertional levels was compromised by non-exertional limitations" (AR 22). Regrettably, since there are no exertional limitations, it must be assumed that Defendant's deceit hurt anyone unfamiliar with what the Grids cover. The Agency also (at p.12) tells the Court that since Plaintiff is 58 or "advanced age" and has no exertional limitations. According to the SSA she can repeatedly lift and carry 100 pounds and over 100 pounds. Presumably the SSA is asking this Court to believe that because someone has a mental disability there is no upper limit to the amount such an individual can lift and carry.

The situation is reminiscent of *Bowen v. New York*, 476 U.S. 467 (1986) where the SSA used secret non-public rules to deny people with mental impairments. The *Bowen* Court

forbade the use of nonpublic procedures like SSR 85-15 and allowed exhaustion waivers against the SSA so an aggrieved party can go directly into federal court by having a case where exhaustion would be futile, have irreparable harm, and be collateral to benefits since here the SSA's secretive policy-SSR 85-15 based on an uncited district court in "MN and use of Rule 404 is to cover-up the non-applicability of the Grids to psychological disabilities and the Supreme Court *Heckler* case.

Nonpublic criteria (procedures, practices and/or policies) are illegal when used under the Social Security Act. Fundamental rights such as Constitutional Due Process are cognizable under *Smith v. Berryhill*, 139 S. Ct. 1765 at 1717 (2019), which states "...Congress wanted more oversight by the courts rather than less under §405(g) and that "Congress designed [the statute as a whole] to be 'unusually protective' of claimants." *Id*.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 3, 2022 /s/ Steven Bruce

Steven Bruce Attorney for Plaintiff